Should the government merely reflect the values of the citizenry, or does the government have a responsibility to lead the Chinese people toward more sustainable behavior? Do you think the government's policies recognize values of sustainability such as public health, well-being, and justice?

4 What should China's role in international environmental politics be? How do the country's policy makers see their responsibilities under various environmental treaties? Is China's position on climate change reasonable?

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

- *China Daily*, "Green China" blog, available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/greenchina/index.html
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's China Environmental Law Initiative, at: http://www.epa.gov/ogc/china/initiative_home.htm
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China, at www.cecc.gov
- Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) official English-language website, at: http://english.mep.gov.cn/
- U.S.-Asia Partnerships for Environmental Law, at: http://www.vermontlaw.edu/academics/environmental_law_center/institutes_and_initiatives/us-china_partnership_for_environmental_law/overview.htm
- Zheng Yisheng and Qian Yihong (1998) "China's Environment, Politics and the Economy: Grave Concerns." Link to U.S. Embassy-Beijing translation: http://gaodawei.wordpress.com/2011/04/09

4 Sustainable Development and National Identity

What are the cultural and historical contexts in which China is trying to achieve sustainable development, and how do they affect the prospects for success? We saw in the last chapter that, at least in its rhetoric, China's stated public commitment to sustainable development is strong. Implementation shortfalls notwithstanding, the government has integrated sustainability into its five-year plans, passed laws mandating an ambitious national renewable energy portfolio, invested in research and development for green technologies and clean air and water initiatives, and participated actively in international discussions of global environmental challenges. However, China's prospects for achieving sustainable development are clouded by a political system that restricts public participation in environmental decision making, a political culture of insecurity, and uncertainty over national identity at a time of enormous economic growth and social change.

National identity can be understood as encompassing core values, world views, and self-understood history. It includes interpretations of where a given people stand at the present moment, as well as future dreams, goals, and ambitions for the destiny of the nation. National identity is socially constructed and malleable (Anderson 1983); it is contested by different social groups and manipulated by the state, which controls the official version of history. In China, for example, the birth and triumph of the Chinese Communist Party are celebrated, but the excesses and ideological extremism of the Cultural Revolution are absent from textbooks, while public debate about its causes is stifled.

The state decides which holidays to celebrate. China marks political holidays such as October 1st, National Day; after Mao Zedong's death the Party relaxed restrictions on traditional festivals such as the Dragon Boat Festival that marks the drowning of the poet Chu Yuan and the Qingming day of reverence for ancestors, thereby signaling that it was distancing itself from the Mao-era characterization of all traditional culture as feudal. The state decides which symbols to use on currency, as when it sent a strong message reasserting the legacy of Mao by putting his face on the reissued 100 *yuan* and other notes in 1999. As the great anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) has taught, national identity is bound up in values and world views that are captured through public symbols and rituals and which give citizens a sense of their connection to their communities and the meaning of their lives. These are all things that the state attempts to control, with varied success; many Han Chinese are skeptical about the official version of history, and non-Han minorities even more so.

Most of China's 55 recognized non-Han minority ethnic groups (comprising about one-tenth of the population) have different narratives, values, and traditions, despite the official version of Chinese history that touts the integrity of Chinese geopolitical borders and the long, unbroken history of the Chinese people. In fact, China's state-building process has been far messier and more complex. Territorial borders have shifted dramatically since the time of the "unifying emperor" Qinshi Huangdi (259–210 BC) and China has twice been ruled by foreign dynasties. The country's present-day border disputes are only now being resolved, with parts of the long border with India still heavily contested. The state has enshrined an uneasy, essentially colonial relationship with frontier peoples. It has done so through the establishment of "autonomous" regions, counties, and towns intended to provide a modicum of self-government and self-determination; through the creation of Minorities Institutes, which are universities and research centers that train minority elites while enshrining and

studying local cultural traditions; and by providing preferential treatment in birth quotas and designating spots for minorities in elite schools. Meanwhile, among the Han, minorities are often stereotyped as lazy, dirty, and exotic, unlike the official version, which shows China and its minorities as one big happy family. Woe to the ethnic minority group that seeks to challenge that narrative.

This chapter argues that the Chinese people are in essence in the throes of a crisis of identity, in which the nation is simultaneously well aware of its world prominence in past Imperial times and of its more recent humiliation at the hands of foreign powers from the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries. This dynamic can be understood, perhaps a bit crudely, as a "superiority-inferiority complex."

On the "superiority" side, there is a proud conviction that in prior millennia China was a great, unified Han civilization. China was the center of civilization, more advanced than other lands, a "Middle Kingdom" (the literal meaning of the Chinese characters for China, *zhongguo* 中国), where an emperor with the Mandate of Heaven to rule enjoyed tribute from other nations whose representatives traveled great distances to the Court to demonstrate their respect. This great Chinese civilization fostered the ancient philosophical traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, among others, all of which articulated high moral values and offered prescriptions for achieving self-cultivation and a harmonious society. With regard to the non-human world, these traditions offered wisdom about the sustainable use of natural resources, reverence for all forms of life, and living in accordance with nature's flow (Weller 2006). Chinese are taught in school that they invented gunpowder, dynamite, the printing press, the compass, and paper, among thousands of other scientific innovations (all well chronicled by the great Sinologist Joseph Needham in his epic 27-volume work, *Science and Civilization in China*); their textbooks often start with the discovery of Peking Man as the first human being and key to a Marxist scientific outlook (Schmalzer 2008). Through

their innovations in building complex waterworks projects, some of which survive to this day, the ancient Chinese harnessed nature by developing centralized political systems that facilitated social organization and flood control. The German Sinologist Karl Wittfogel (1957) even hypothesized, too simplistically perhaps, that the level of centralization required for such irrigation projects in "hydraulic societies" explains the emergence of the Chinese dynastic imperial system. Nonetheless, Yu the Great, the legendary founding emperor of the Xia Dynasty (about 2100 BC), is said to have gained his power and legitimacy by taming the waters during a great flood, cutting irrigation canals into the earth in place of failed dykes, and creating massive irrigation works, as in the historical tale, "Yu the Great controls the waters" [*Da Yu zhishui* 大禹治水]. In later years, Mao situated himself squarely within this tradition, building multiple dams and dreaming of blocking the Three Gorges on the Yangzi River. Mastery of nature has thus been a consistent part of the narrative of state power from prehistory, establishing a link between dynastic legitimacy and control of resources.

Most Chinese are ruefully aware, however, that somewhere along the way their great civilization lost this advantage, becoming known throughout the world as the "sick man of Asia," or as the founding father of modern China, Sun Yat-sen, famously put it in 1924, "a pile of loose sand," vulnerable to depredations and incursions of imperialist powers. This equally significant element of Chinese national identity thus tells the more recent history of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. Indeed, the final dynasty, the Qing (1644–1911), was not Han but Manchu, a minority people from what is today Northeast China.

The events of the "centuries of humiliation" are sometimes treated as if they occurred yesterday. The Chinese were forced to import opium after the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century, with the concomitant problems of dependency and addiction, because the trade was highly lucrative for the British and other foreign powers who exchanged

opium for Chinese tea. These wars were followed by a series of "unequal treaties" the Chinese were forced to sign in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Imposed by foreign powers after military defeat, they induced the Chinese to give up valuable land such as Hong Kong and Macao (to the British and Portuguese, respectively), to open their ports to foreign trade, to permit foreign missionaries to proselytize, and to allow foreign nationals to be subject not to Chinese law but to foreign legal systems while living in China. The centuries of humiliation also included the Russian invasion of Manchuria in the Northeast in 1900 and the carving of the great city of Shanghai into colonial fiefdoms, where elegant parts of town were off limits to Chinese. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, some of the unequal treaties with European colonial powers were abrogated. But the country descended into regional warlordism and a debilitating, multi-phase civil war between the Communists (CCP) and Nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT, or Guomindang or GMD depending on the Romanization system). This internal strife continued even during the invasion of China by Japan, the "rape" of the city of Nanjing in 1937, and the flight of both Nationalist and Communist armies toward the interior. When the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the civil war flared anew. Understandably, the Communist victory in 1949 was widely celebrated, with its promise of peace and prosperity. Mao's famous proclamation, as he stood on the reviewing stand at Tiananmen Square, "The Chinese people have stood up!" symbolized the passionate aspirations of the Chinese people.

A Communist Youth League instructor once lectured me for hours about the sins of foreign colonial powers. I had the misfortune to be berthed opposite him on an overnight train in Sichuan Province. He seemed to hold me personally responsible for the evils of my imperialist forebears, despite my protestations that I had not been born when any of these things happened, nor had my ancestors been involved in Asia. It was a good opportunity for me to see what every Chinese student is taught in mandatory "theory" and "Party history" classes in

high school and university, and to understand why resentment toward foreigners may still lurk just beneath the surface of otherwise hospitable interactions.

Since those years of humiliation, China has struggled to reclaim what it regards as its rightful place at the center of the world. There is thus great sensitivity to indications of respect and rank. A preoccupation with "face" and status lies at the core of the tension between superiority and inferiority in Chinese national identity; the country's position in the eyes of the world is a primary concern for China and its citizens. This prickliness to questions of "face" arguably governs at least some of the country's international behavior. Memories of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers can induce hair-trigger reactions to perceived slights (Gries 2005). Aggressive nationalism flares up easily, as is seen in competition against other nations for claims to ocean resources in the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea, which China recently proclaimed to be "core interests" along with Taiwan and Tibet.

This preoccupation underlay the delirium of national happiness when China was awarded the 2008 Olympics after many failed bids, and it helps explain the government's nervousness about air quality and the weather on opening night. So determined was the central government that the Olympics would mark China's great coming-out party on the world stage that it invested great sums to train athletes to win gold medals, even in sports where China had no prior tradition. It mobilized thousands of song and dance troupe members for years of preparation for the most lavish opening ceremonies in history The focus on reputation and status plays into China's desire to build the world's tallest, fanciest, most innovative and expensive buildings. Architects adore receiving Chinese commissions, for it seems there is no limit on imagination or cost, and buildings like the Bird's Nest stadium have won prizes throughout the world. (Embarrassingly, however, Rem Koolhaas' 2008 CCTV edifice has been nicknamed "the big underpants" for its two-legged design.) The Chinese are building the world's fastest trains, longest bridges, and most modern airports. The preoccupation with China's reputation contributes to the investment in the space program and the emphasis on putting a man on the moon, even at a time when rural children's parents struggle to pay school fees and Mao-era safety nets for workers and retirees have all but disappeared. National pride helps explain why China persisted in building the Three Gorges Dam at a time when developed countries were rethinking the wisdom of megaprojects that so dramatically alter the natural environment. "Face" also helps to explain why the Chinese reacted with outrage in 1995 when American environmentalist Lester Brown's book *Who Will Feed China?* raised concerns about the global grain supply. The Chinese even published a rebuttal called "China Will Feed China," as if it were an insult to imply that China could not be self-reliant in grain (in fact, China's increasing reliance on the international grain market has had an impact on food prices, which is being felt painfully in the world's poorest countries, as basic foodstuffs become increasingly expensive).

In international forums, sensitivity over "face" may explain why Chinese negotiators temporarily left the 2009 Copenhagen round of climate change negotiations in a huff when they discovered they had not been included in some side events, as well as the effort they put into placing a Chinese among the top officials at the International Monetary Fund when the 2011 arrest of Dominique Strauss-Kahn appeared to provide an opening at the top leadership (they won a number three spot). It may help explain China's active efforts to improve its poor reputation as an international investor that disregards the environment and vulnerable communities in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Preoccupation with face may also motivate some of China's behavior toward the Republic of China, Taiwan. China has provided generous aid to some of the world's smallest countries when they agreed to renege on their recognition of Taiwan. China even

blocked membership for Taiwan in the World Health Organization despite the fact that Taiwan, along with Hong Kong and Guangdong, was at the center of the major SARS virus outbreak in 2003. (Taiwan gained observer status at the WHO governing body in 2009.) The principle of a united China also plays a role in these efforts to regain past glory and reassert the Communist Party's defeat of the Kuomintang once and for all. The return of Hong Kong to China from British rule in 1997, one of the last vestiges of the unequal treaties, was marked with year-long, government-orchestrated celebrations, including performances, special souvenirs, lavish propaganda, and public demonstrations of apparently sincere patriotic joy. This has since been complicated by Hong Kong residents' 2014 "umbrella revolution" to protect the "one country, two systems" promises that China would not interfere with the democratic system the British left behind.

CHINESE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS

Chinese identity is, of course, far more complex than a matter of face. Indeed, to the extent that national culture usually involves some account of the human relationship to the non-human world, some Chinese environmentalists believe that traditional Chinese culture's elements of sustainability may provide important guidance during the current spiritual crisis of disillusionment and materialism. Their task is to create an ethical justification for a home-grown environmentalism. It must make sense in the Chinese context and not simply appear to be a Western import intended to prevent China from developing, as some government policy makers suspect and suggest. All three major ancient traditions have themes related to what we now call sustainability. Confucianism does so from an anthropocentric, or human-centered environmental perspective; Buddhism from a biocentric, or life-centered perspective; and Daoism from an ecocentric, or ecosystem-centered perspective (Weller 2006). Interestingly, Western environmental

traditions have a similar range of philosophical approaches. The "stewardship" mandate of the Judeo-Christian tradition is human centered; the humane compassion of those who protect animals from cruelty and exploitation is rooted in reverence for the lives of all individual beings. The eco-centered land ethic guides conservation biologists and leads them to protect the world's "last great places," "critical eco-regions," "biogems," and "biodiversity hotspots" (in phrases used by the Nature Conservancy, World Wide Fund for Nature, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Conservation International).

Many of China's ethnic minorities also have a history of stewardship and protection of the land. "Sacred groves," "sacred mountains," and sacred lakes" are de facto protected areas where biodiversity flourishes. All the more destructive of local culture, then, are the Han incursions for mining, hydropower, and mass tourism. The Naxi minority, for example, who number about 300,000 and live in Yunnan Province in Southwest China, have a deep tradition of reverence for nature and a strict code that governs the use of water and harvesting of trees. Many of their forests were cut down during the Great Leap Forward and religious practices were banned during the Cultural Revolution. In one of the old ceremonies kept alive by religious leaders, prayers and offerings are made to the god of nature, asking to be forgiven for the damage to nature in daily life. If water and trees are not protected, it is believed, bad things such as floods, diseases, and crop failures will result.

In ancient China, as reflected in today's Communist Party's stated goal to achieve a "Harmonious Society," sociopolitical harmony in the human world was the most important social value. Orderly hierarchical relationships were bedrocks of the dominant Confucian tradition (and may underlie some of the preoccupation with respect and status described above). Such classics as the *Analects* teach moral qualities that promote both good leadership and loyalty. Rank and role, correctly performed, are the basis for social order. The correct performance of loyalty to one's superiors is amply repaid with paternalistic protection

(Evasdottir 2004). Yet despite the focus on human relationships and such core values as filial piety, benevolence, ritual, morality, and loyalty [*xiao, ren, li, de, zhong* 孝,仁,礼,德,忠], Confucianism also provides sensible precepts like protecting spawning fish and refraining from hunting in spring when animals are young. Raising freshwater prawn in rice paddies and carp in pools, as has been done in China for millennia, is often cited as one of the earliest examples of a sustainable and efficient farming system.

Chinese Buddhism (one of many schools of Buddhism, which is practiced differently in Sri Lanka, India, Tibet, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, and elsewhere), retains the notion of reincarnation of souls. Chinese Buddhist monks and nuns are often vegetarian, and many devout practitioners visit temples to have a vegetarian meal. On some festival days, Buddhists will purchase and release a bird, fish, or turtle as a way of gaining merit and as an acknowledgement of the connection among living beings and the desire to practice loving kindness to animals. There is thus a close relationship between nature and morality, with compassion to others held as one of the most important virtues. Tibetan Buddhism is even more careful about non-interference with nature, with its many sacred lakes and mountains and belief that cutting into the earth for mining violates the earth gods and that hunting animals for more than subsistence creates bad karma. Tibetan Buddhism has particular appeal for some Han Chinese environmentalists, a few of whom have converted, as depicted in the short film "Searching for Sacred Mountain" (Marcuse 2014).

Daoism, the most metaphysical of the three traditions, is famous for the saying, "the way that can be named is not the eternal way" [*dao ke dao, fei chang dao* 道可道，非常道]. It emphasizes the relationship between humans and the cosmos and sees man as a microcosm of nature, with the energetic *qi* [气], or life-force, flowing throughout the universe. Concepts of balance, the yin and the yang, and action through non-action are associated with this often-mystical school with many roots in folk traditions. Famously, the tradition discusses the power of *wuwei* [无为], or doing nothing. Compared with Confucianism and Buddhism, it most closely approximates ecological thinking, which also studies the flow of energy through ecosystems within the discipline of bioenergetics.

By contrast with these three ancient traditions, a fourth philosophical influence, more powerful by far, has come to dominate the developed world, including China, since the industrial revolution. Western-style modernization, which seeks to master nature through technological innovation, posits a separation between the human and non-human world and views nature as a force to be tamed. Some have seen this as an extension of a Judeo-Christian approach separating humans from nature, as articulated most famously in a 1967 essay by Lynn T. White, Jr., "The historical roots of our ecological crisis." In response to White's essay, some Christians plumbed the Bible for its environmental wisdom, using examples such as "Song of Songs" and the story of St. Francis of Assisi to find inspiration within the tradition (Hessel and Ruether 2000). In China, ironically, the modernization ethos received its starkest expression during the Maoist period, dominated by the slogan, "Man Must Conquer Nature" [*ren ding sheng tian* 人定胜天], which led to endless human suffering and destruction of wetlands and rainforests, and cast nature as an enemy to be humbled and punished (Shapiro 2001).

BIODIVERSITY AND ANIMAL WELFARE

Let us shift now for a moment to consider an example of how Chinese traditional values and practices influence present-day trends. This is particularly clear when we consider threats to biodiversity and the harsh treatment of animals, both domestically and overseas. A classic saying about the people of Guangzhou is that they will eat anything

that has four legs except a table. But Cantonese cuisine is just the most obvious example of how traditional Chinese preferences can increase pressure on endangered species. The close association between food and medicine is well established and deeply rooted in ancient historical study and practice. In addition to the use of herbs, acupuncture, and movement practices like Tai Qi and Qigong that do not have negative environmental impacts, Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) makes use of the body parts of endangered mammals and reptiles, as well as also some endangered plants such as ginseng root, which can be shaped like a human being and is considered an aphrodisiac. In TCM, the consumer is often believed to acquire the characteristics of the animal eaten – fierceness, sexual prowess, vigor, longevity, and so on. Traditional Chinese Medicine ingredients include tiger bones and claws, rhinoceros horns, shark fins, and the fetuses, scales, and blood of the less well-known pangolin, a type of scaly anteater whose Southeast Asian population is being decimated for meat and medicine. A broad spectrum of turtle species, including sea turtles, is now disappearing due to demand from the Chinese market. Other less commonly known endangered species used in TCM also include the musk deer, sun bear, and Chinese alligator. In an example of how widespread and arcane this problem can be, an elderly Chinese man from California was convicted in 2014 of smuggling swim bladders from the red-listed Totoaba fish from the Gulf of Mexico, each bladder worth $5,000 in the resale Chinese market and considered a cure for infertility, poor circulation, and skin problems.

Until recently, the high cost of these rare wild animals and plants meant that only the elite could afford them, and their purchase and consumption was often associated with high status, luxury wealth display, gift-giving, and demonstrations of filial piety, often to revered elders in need of a pick-me-up. But the skyrocketing purchasing power of the Chinese middle class has placed extreme pressure on these species, despite China's adherence to the Convention on the

International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which China joined in 1981 and which it supports with 22 branch offices. Although CITES is one of the global community's oldest environmental treaties, it is underfunded, under-monitored, and poorly enforced at borders, where customs officials often lack training to differentiate between permitted and illegal goods – there is far more pressure to screen for drugs and illegal immigrants. However, according to the NGO TRAFFIC, which monitors and supports CITES, the illegal trade in such creatures has a global value estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars a year, and is often associated with other, better-known illegal activities.

Not all biodiversity loss associated with traditional Chinese culture is related to food and medicine; ivory has been a favored medium for Chinese carvings and trinkets since the Ming dynasty, albeit less favored than jade; entire tusks can be seen in museums, carved with elaborate scenes of people, pagodas, ships, and latticework. The current decimation of African elephant populations is so grave that experts predict extinction in the wild by 2020 if the situation is not brought under control. However, the slaughter of elephants is closely tied to organized criminal syndicates run out of China that also traffic human beings, trade in drugs, and channel funds to rebel armies and rogue militias; about 70% of the ivory taken from African elephants is destined for China (with the U.S. and its large Asian population the second largest market). Poaching has increased dramatically in areas where Chinese are building roads and other major infrastructure projects (about which more in a later section). In effect, elephant tusks have become the "blood diamonds" of the 21st century; elephant poaching has been tied to the Lord's Resistance Army, where the warlord Joseph Kony has reportedly demanded tusks to help pay for his atrocities, as well as to state-sponsored militias and/or rebel groups in Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. The situation has become so dire that poachers are using helicopters to shoot their prey and

chainsaws to remove tusks, and park rangers commonly lose their lives in an effort to defend their charges.

Another example of the pressures that traditional Chinese preferences are exerting on biodiversity is in the fishing industry, where aesthetic and cultural values are promoting the destruction of coral reefs in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The Chinese favor fish that are alive and colorful (especially the auspicious red), believing them to be fresher. In fact, live fish can fetch five times the price of dead ones. Consumers prefer to purchase living animals in wet markets and select them from tanks in restaurants. Some dishes even require the living fish to be placed directly in hot oil. The Chinese market's impact is particularly intense in the Philippines and Indonesia, where poor fishermen often feel they have little choice but to resort to illegal fishing methods so as to harvest as many fish as possible. These include injecting cyanide directly into polyps, which kills the coral and disorients and half-paralyzes the resident fish, making it easy to net them. The methods also include placing dynamite on the reef, a process that kills most of the fish but allows the harvest of some living ones. The center of the live fish trade is in Hong Kong, where about 30% of the catch is re-exported to China.

Sharks, usually harvested by slicing the fins and throwing the animals into the sea to drown (a technique that allows a vessel to magnify its take) are prized for cartilage that is largely tasteless and supplies texture; claims that it has medicinal properties are specious. Yet shark fin soup remains a high-status delicacy at weddings and expensive restaurants wherever many Chinese live. The trade is so lucrative that a pound of fin can sell for US$300, despite increasingly urgent attention from CITES, which has placed four species on its Appendix II list. With the expansion of Chinese global economic might, shark fishing now has worldwide reach, with coastal Africa particularly vulnerable as poor fishermen see opportunities and new markets. In Tanzania, dolphins are dynamited to use as shark bait, while in Mozambique the fin trade is frightening off the international reef divers drawn to a nascent ecotourism industry (Smith 2013). South Africa is a hub of illegal shark fishing in the region, although Hong Kong is its global center and the Taiwanese mafia is also heavily involved, particularly in Latin America. The ENGO WildAid is featuring basketball star Yao Ming in an anti-finning campaign, about which more in the next chapter. The campaign is having an effect, as awareness of the cruelty of the finning practice, as well as of the ecological impact of removing apex predators from the ocean, seems to be spreading among younger Chinese.

Many species of bears are similarly vulnerable due to their role in TCM. The use of bear bile is mentioned in Chinese medical texts as early as the 7th century. Within China, some 7,000 bears on 200 farms spend their lives in cages, tubes inserted into them to extract bile. Unlike some of the other TCMs that use parts from endangered species, it seems that bear bile does have an efficacious effect on some diseases, although synthetic substitutions do just as well. It is difficult to persuade the Chinese consumer, however, that chemical replacements work, even as they remain persuaded that bile taken from a wild bear is more effective than that tapped from a captive one. Bear bile "farming" and consumption tends to be a domestic issue of concern because of its horrific implications for animal welfare, although, with the decimation of bear populations in China and nearby countries, hunters have shifted as far away as the U.S. There they target American black bears in the Shenandoah, Berkshires, and elsewhere. Although the species is not protected under CITES, the export of bear gall bladders is illegal as it is covered under the Lacey Act. In the U.S., bear bladders are made into medicine or sold whole, often in New York, California, and other states with large Chinese populations. Smugglers have been caught digging ginseng in North America as well, particularly in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Meanwhile, an epidemic of rhino horn thefts associated with an Irish ring active in

Asia has struck the museums and private collections of Europe and the UK, with rhino horn worth as much as US$65,000 per kilo on the black market even though it is made of the same keratin as a human fingernail.

Finally, we would be remiss not to note that the Chinese shift toward a meat-based diet, from one where sliced meat was used as a condiment or accent ingredient rather than the main dish, has implications for global croplands conversion, water scarcity, animal welfare, and climate change. We know that every pound of feedlot-produced beef requires seven pounds of grain. From an environmental point of view, meat consumption is a singularly inefficient use of energy, water, and land, while from an animal welfare perspective, it is worse still. China is seeking to "modernize" its meat production system through the introduction of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) and other horrors of the developed world and it has also purchased meat and fish suppliers overseas, including the U.S. pork producer Smithfield Foods and rights to some of the offshore fisheries of Peru. These are excellent investments from the Chinese perspective, given the widespread mistrust of domestically produced meats, vegetables, and milk, after a long series of scandals and discoveries of heavy metals and pesticides in everything from rice to tea. It is also a way of compensating for its paucity of arable land and water. As Mark Bittman put it in a *New York Times* opinion piece, "the Smithfield deal is a land and water grab" (Bittman 2013).

The above examples and trends tell us that traditional Chinese belief systems and aesthetic values, coupled with a newly wealthy middle class with adventurous food tastes in addition to a widespread mistrust of domestically produced food, are a toxic combination for global biodiversity. While climate change may eventually become the final blow, habitat loss, pollution, overharvesting, invasive species, and destructive technologies are already causing a global collapse of life forms (Kolbert 2014). Unfortunately, Chinese consumers are a big part of that story.

THE MAO YEARS AND THEIR LEGACY

We return now to our overview of China's historical legacy and its impact on the environmental challenges of today. Imperial decay, humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, warlordism, Japanese invasion, and civil war were followed in 1949 by the Communist victory, and patriotic Chinese returned to the mainland from around the world to build "New China." Children born during the first years of the revolution were told they were the luckiest people in the world (Liang and Shapiro 1983). But almost 30 years of political upheaval and human and natural catastrophe left China in dire straits. During the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution, intense competition to be more revolutionary than the next person forced people to try to outdo each other in self-sacrifice and suffering. There were enormous political risks involved in any hint of "bourgeois" consumption; a person could be accused of bourgeois liberalism for growing a flower on a balcony, owning a cat or dog, or sitting on a padded chair. Meanwhile, Mao's campaigns to conquer nature felled forests to fuel makeshift steel furnaces, left forests denuded, and filled lakes and wetlands for ill-advised "Grain First" campaigns. Rivers were choked with the effluent of thousands of improperly sited and outfitted factories which had been relocated to the mountainous interior in the belief that they would be safer from aerial attack from the Russians. Urban "educated youth" were sent to China's border areas to prepare for war with the Soviet Union and Vietnam while remolding nature and themselves, even as professors and scholars who best understood the ecological value of biodiverse forests and wetlands were attacked as counter-revolutionaries and revisionists (Shapiro 2001). By the time of Mao's death in September 1976, China was isolated from much of the world, economically stagnant, and reeling from waves of political campaigns that had swept away the country's brightest, leaving survivors groping for ethical moorings.

The Chinese people then began to emerge from their long political and ideological nightmare. In December 1978, with the legendary Third Plenary Session of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, reform-minded leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang returned to power and endorsed a development program called the Four Modernizations (in agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology), which opened China to the outside world after decades of isolation. Many of the new leaders had been victims of the Cultural Revolution. When they were sent to the countryside in punishment for their "counter-revolutionary" ideas, they saw firsthand how profoundly Mao's policies had failed the farmers. They launched a daring series of economic experiments to unleash the Chinese people's entrepreneurial initiative and to encourage their aspirations for better lives. Reforms spread gradually from rural areas to cities, where enterprises were made "responsible for their own profits and losses" rather than enjoying a guaranteed "iron rice bowl" of state support. With time, these reforms provided tremendous economic freedom, even to the point that China now seems more freewheelingly capitalistic than the West. Yet political reforms were limited, and village level elections were mostly prearranged until recent years. The Communist Party set policy, the national (State) government implemented it, and ordinary people had little ability to choose their leaders or their political system.

The Chinese people's desire for a better life after so much suffering, undergirded by their endless hard work and creativity, launched one of the greatest social transformations in history. A backlog of pent-up yearning for such basic creature comforts as upholstered furniture, wristwatches, bicycles, washing machines, and radios was gradually supplanted by a desire for status symbols and luxury goods. Rising expectations, intense competition, materialism, consumerism, and a focus on individual advancement replaced Mao-era slogans like "Serve the People" [*wei renmin fuwu* 为人民服务], which no longer carried weight. The Mao years left a legacy of corruption and disillusionment

with the government which Chinese scholars and intellectuals have called a "crisis of confidence" [*xinyang weiji* 信仰危机] in public goals and values. The vacuum led people to cling to consumerism as a way to provide meaning to their lives and to be willing to tolerate a government which otherwise had betrayed them. There is much cynicism about public service or willingness to help anyone outside of personal networks, as seen during an October 2011 incident in Foshan in Guangdong Province, when passers-by failed to help a toddler who was struck by a vehicle, who was then, when no one stopped to help her, struck again and killed (Osnos 2014). Public outrage and widespread discussion of the lack of compassion in Chinese national character followed in microblogs and Internet polls. Activist Dai Qing told the *New York Times*' Michael Wines (2011) that the by-passers' callousness reflected a vacuum of beliefs: "All the traditional values of Chinese society were thrown out the window to make way for Mao and the rest of the party leadership. But that died long ago, and there was nothing to replace it except a materialistic hunger."

Whether environmental protection can ever become a shared public value under these circumstances is unclear (Bauer 2006). As far as environmental issues are concerned, there is an entrenched assumption, which is perhaps a legacy of the days when the government controlled all aspects of life, that even such public-spirited activities as cleaning trash from a river or from an apartment stairwell should be the job of the authorities. This attitude exacerbates tendencies to flout the law with respect to natural resources and/or pollution if so doing benefits oneself, one's family, and one's network of associates. (The melamine problem mentioned in previous chapters is a good example of this.) It also explains a tendency to litter, which reached a peak in the 1990s; Wang Yongchen, a journalist and founder of Green Earth Volunteers, began her career filing stories about the massive amounts of garbage left by Chinese tourists visiting Lake Dianchi near Kunming.

Mistrust of Party and government leadership, and concomitant lack of respect for regulations and common goals, have if anything been intensified by a traditional culture that emphasizes personal relationships, obligations, and connections rather than the rule of law. The post-Mao period has seen much waste of public assets and a culture of self-centeredness and desperation to succeed by any means. Frequent propaganda campaigns, and even executions of high-level officials for embezzlement and corruption, are aimed at stopping high officials' use of public funds for banquets, private cars, and brand name status symbols, but they seem to do little to change a national behavior pattern of wealth flaunting, self-interestedness, and disrespect for the law. Counterfeit currency, online scams, and fraudulent schemes abound at all levels of society. Moreover, the love of status symbols has fueled a huge market in fakes, creating a major international intellectual property headache and a cat-and-mouse effort to catch shipments of knockoff Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Burberry, Coach, and North Face products at customs checkpoints. Meanwhile, in the impoverished interior and rural backwaters near wealthy areas, the desperately poor dream of taking their turn. Young people often join "floating populations" in the slums of the big cities and sweatshops in manufacturing hubs in the Southeast, leaving their hometowns all but empty of laborers. The massive influx of migrant workers returning home for Spring Festival is an annual ritual that cripples the public transportation system.

A wonderful anecdote reported by Rebecca Marston of the BBC captures the focus on status of China's newly rich, as well as their emphasis on creating bonds of social obligation through generous gift-giving and sharing (2011). A group of wealthy businessmen were asked to bring their best bottles of imported wine to a gathering; some bottles cost as much as $1,600 apiece. They then poured them into a huge silver punchbowl and shared the contents as if they were so much sangria. (Other stories that also cause oenophiles to have heart attacks describe fine wines mixed with orange soda or Coke.) This story captures the emphasis on face and wealth display, on collective life and the forging of the bonds of *guanxi* [关系, or mutually indebted personal connections], and on the brash crudeness of some of China's nouveaux riches. The Chinese love of status symbols has been a godsend for Louis Vuitton, which already makes 40 percent of its profit from Chinese buyers, for Gucci, with more than 40 stores in China, and for Burberry, Rolls Royce, Audi and other pricey brands. China is number two in world consumption of luxury goods after Japan and ahead of the U.S. The Chinese are still trying to figure things out, however: I was once accosted by a young woman on the street in Chongqing wanting to know if "Malika" was a high status brand of cosmetics because she had just signed on to be a saleswoman. I eventually figured out she was talking about Mary Kay. In 2014, China remained the top buyer of luxury goods, with Chinese consumers purchasing 46% of global share (Xinhua 2015).

The Chinese focus on status symbols may sometimes seem puzzling, but the recent history of war, hardship, and political upheaval explains some of the intensity of the huge unmet consumer demand. An awareness of the Chinese people's tribulations of the last century may provide a sympathetic context for current high levels of conspicuous consumption (Yu 2014). However, it is sobering to consider the sharpening inequalities between rich and poor, coast and hinterland, for despite the high living standards of the middle and upper classes, millions of Chinese have yet to begin to satisfy their craving for consumption and wealth. According to the English-language official newspaper *China Daily*, the wealth gap between urban and rural Chinese is generally about 3.3 to 1, which Song Xiaowu, president of the China Society for Economic Reform, called an "appalling income disparity between the haves and have-nots" (Fu 2010). The sharp contrasts between rich and poor exacerbate the feeling of desperation among the poor and may contribute to the "me first" atmosphere that

governs so many interactions. Migrant workers are motivated by "face" to send expensive gifts to their parents in the countryside and hide from them the harsh working conditions many of them endure in factories far from home, and are quick to seize on opportunities that appear to deliver a quick way out of poverty. So, too, are illegal immigrants in the West willing to endure tremendous privation and cruel working conditions. They must repay their "snakehead" smugglers and perform the Confucian duty of filial piety by sending home remittances and give their parents the "face" that comes with having offspring overseas.

As we see from the account above, China is engaged in a quest to reassert its historic great-power status, transforming urban landscapes, "conquering" nature with mega-projects, and engaging beyond its borders in ways designed to inspire notice and respect. Yet in the nationwide push for modernization, sustainability and social justice often fall by the wayside. During the past 30-plus years, China's economic growth and participation in global affairs have created some of the most dramatic social and economic changes ever to occur in a single country in such a short time; the prize of global respect is within reach. However, among the costs of such growth is some of the world's worst pollution, which threatens the people's health and well-being as well as the country's image in the world and the government's legitimacy at home. The most dramatic example of China's drive to achieve a modernity designed to inspire the world's respect is undoubtedly the Three Gorges Dam.

The Three Gorges Dam has traditional roots in the longing for relief from natural disasters, an extension of the responsibility imperial leaders felt to tame the rivers that have so often brought the Chinese people sorrow. Indeed, the dam can be understood as a triumph of the national longing for flood control, although when it was approved many of the arguments centered on energy production. The dam was a dream of modern China's founding father Sun Yat-sen in the early

20th century, and celebrated further by Mao in this well-known anonymous translation of his famous poem:

> Great plans are afoot:
> A bridge will fly to span the north and south,
> Turning a deep chasm into a thoroughfare;
> Walls of stone will stand upstream to the West
> To hold back Wushan's clouds and rain
> Until a smooth lake rises in the narrow gorges.
> The mountain goddess, if she is still there
> Will marvel at a world so changed.

Only after Mao's death, however, did technocratic leaders – led by the widely disliked former engineer and then-Premier Li Peng – have the technical and financial confidence to go forward with the plan. When the dam was approved, opposition in the National People's Congress and among ordinary people was widespread. Resistance was especially fierce in the region above the dam, among the citizens and intellectuals of the huge industrial city of Chongqing, which stood to see its Mao-era factories with their residues of toxic heavy metals inundated and the swiftly flowing Yangzi turned into a stagnant catch-all for garbage and sewage. However, opposition could be expressed only passively: A 1992 vote taken by the Congress saw most people withhold the usual rubber-stamp for Party decisions by refraining from raising their hands. The prominent anti-dam activist, NPC member and former nuclear physicist and engineer Dai Qing, edited two informative collections of essays about the risks of the dam, *Yangtze!,Yangtze!* (1994) and *The River Dragon Has Come: The Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China's Yangtse River and Its People* (1998), and was later imprisoned for a year, nominally for her support of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. Today, the dam stands as a monument to man's hubris and China's desire to obtain the admiration of the world.

As predicted, it forcibly relocated more than two million people, was plagued with corruption and substandard construction and erosion, submerged rare archaeological structures, and likely dealt the last blow to the Yangzi River dolphin. Given their willingness to permit recent problems with the dam to be publicized, it is unlikely that the current group of Chinese leaders would have approved its current configuration, despite an official position that defends its flood control and electricity generation capacities. Nonetheless, small and large dams remain a critical part of China's plans to increase renewable energy percentages, despite frequent outcries about inadequate environmental impact assessments and siting on earthquake-prone grounds in the Far West, where much of China's unexploited hydropower potential lies. That a destructive project like the Three Gorges could be rammed through despite such widespread opposition gives little comfort to those concerned about some of the ambitious engineering efforts on the table today.

With little doubt, the modernization ethos, guided by the technocratic engineers who populate so many of the top echelons of China's Communist Party and state government, dominates and supersedes the traditions of Confucian sustainability, Buddhist reverence for life, and Daoist ecology. However, China's environmental problems do not lend themselves to a technological fix; they are political problems, social problems, and even problems of deep culture and philosophy. China's intellectuals understand the centrality of the culture question, and indeed they have been wrestling with it for more than 100 years.

DEBATE ABOUT CHINESE CULTURE

An old conundrum for educated Chinese is whether Chinese culture is stagnant, stifling, and feudalistic or the basis of a unique, harmonious, advanced, and superior Eastern civilization (Link 1992). During the late Qing dynasty at the turn of the 20th century, there was a protracted public debate about whether aspects of foreign culture could be used selectively to serve China – could China simply adopt the West's technology or must it also import Western ideas? During the 1919 May Fourth movement, a time of democratic expression and intellectual ferment, young people consciously rejected Chinese feudalistic and paternalistic social structures and embraced modern Western literature, lifestyles, and political ideas. In the early 1920s, the novella, *The True Story of Ah Q*, a masterpiece by Lu Xun, portrayed the Chinese people as rationalizing their oppression and humiliation with infantilism, passivity, and self-deception. Much more recently, in 1988, the documentary film maker Su Xiaokang took up some of the same themes in his six-part series, "River Elegy" [*heshang* 河殇]. By portraying the traditional symbol of Chinese greatness, the Great Wall, as a source of conservatism and isolation and contrasting the invigorating "blue" seas of modern foreign ideas with the dried-up culture of the Yellow River (widely known as the cradle of Chinese civilization), he captured Chinese intellectuals' deep ambivalence about Chinese tradition, so often experienced as stultifying and insular, as compared with fresh ideas from the outside world. The political sensitivity of this critique of traditional Chinese culture, which preceded the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations which were the greatest threat to the power of the Chinese Communist Party since their victory in 1949, resulted in the filmmaker being driven into exile in the U.S. In China, the nationwide criticism and denunciation of the film blamed it for promoting bourgeois ideas and contributing to student unrest.

The ongoing vitality and urgency of the debate over national identity is reflected in the enormous popularity of Jiang Rong's 2008 semi-autobiographical novel, *Wolf Totem* (published in 2004 as *Lang Tuteng* 狼图腾 in Chinese), which sold so many copies in China that only the little red book, *Quotations from Chairman Mao*, has sold more. The lead character is a Han Chinese "sent down" to Inner Mongolia in the 1960s, where he learns the secrets of indigenous knowledge

about the relationship between wolves and the grasslands ecosystem and then witnesses how Han culture destroys that balance. Settlers eradicate the wolves that keep the gazelles in check. They destroy the grasslands and the creatures that live on it by turning them into farmland. Weak and passive Han culture is contrasted with the wild courage of the Mongol herdsmen (connected to that of the wolf), and thus the novel becomes an indictment of Han Chinese passivity as compared with the courage of the meat-eating, wolf-like natives. It is an elegy for the ethnic minority culture, grasslands, and the creatures destroyed wantonly by Han bureaucrats and settlers.

Nowadays, variations of the same debate continue as a quiet struggle rages over China's national identity. There are unresolved questions about the legacy of the Mao period, doubts about the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and competing visions of the country's guiding values and goals. Most of this discussion takes place at the margins of social, political, and intellectual life, expressed indirectly in the press and academic studies because a full airing of the issues might call the government's legitimacy into question. Yet its implications for China's development are enormous. The value placed on "face" sometimes leads a country to make ill-considered judgments about the use of national funds, as occurred when so much money was spent on the Three Gorges Dam and is now being spent on space exploration, when China would be better served by investing in improving the lot of the poor. But there is hope that the narrative of sustainability may yet become strong enough to guide China's development decisions. Acknowledging the spirit of national questioning, the central government has attempted to shape the conversation by introducing the notion of a "China Dream." This is meant to spur ordinary people to help realize a collective Chinese vision of well-being, with the implication that this is quite different from the "American dream" of individual freedom and material consumption. Although so far the China Dream seems to emphasize prosperity and national rejuvenation, sustainability has also been a theme in the conversation.

China's people face a long list of questions about their identity; both the government and the newly ambitious citizenry have some soul-searching to do. Is China to look to the past and reconnect with its heritage of civility, respect for the ancient and pragmatic understanding of the value of sustainable management practices? Is China to focus on the present moment as it builds wealth and power and expends its energies on material success? Is China to look toward the future to become an innovator in the search for new models of sustainable development and a leader in global citizenship? How are the Chinese people to understand their history and destiny, with memories of past humiliations so vivid, and nagging suspicions that flaws in national culture and character may have contributed to the country's suffering and may yet presage future disasters? How is China's government to deal with the painful legacy of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen massacre, and with the enormous pressures of exploding consumption demands and mounting environmental problems? These questions recur as the Chinese struggle to find guidance through the environmental quagmire: Does the answer lie in the Confucian tradition of harmony between the heavens – often understood as nature – and man [*tian-ren heyi* 天人合一] as a way of building social stability? Is it in the Buddhist tradition of reverence for life? Or perhaps in the Daoist "Way" of accommodating nature and going with the flow? Or, as contemporary policy makers seem to believe, in a blend of Maoist and capitalist modernization and nature conquest? Is the solution to "return to the roots" as seen in the fashion for things Tibetan and rural, or to turn outwards to the West and adopt the ethos of the global environmental movement? Do Chinese ideas of nature provide the most guidance, or those of foreign environmentalists? Does the answer lie with the individual or the collective? Discussions of many of these questions are nascent, but the government's fear of organized groups and its

desire to control the official version of China's recent history, particularly the Cultural Revolution, acts as a deterrent to a full and open national dialogue.

As we have seen in this chapter, the Chinese people seem at times to swing between jingoism, or pugnacious nationalism, and insecurity, or what a psychologist might call "low self-esteem." Every interaction with outsiders is the more sensitive because it is scrutinized for evidence of China's relative status. Traditions that emphasize social hierarchy, which are also very much alive in other Confucian societies like Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore, have become exaggerated as China flexes its muscles in international politics. The deep-rooted concern for "face" has colored China's development decisions, leading the government to put resources into tangible, image-building achievements, coupled with efforts to reach out internally and internationally to guarantee supplies of energy, grain, and raw materials and to "pacify the borders" once and for all. Often, such decisions are detrimental to social needs. We have also seen how traditional beliefs can have an impact on endangered species and biodiversity all around the world. Despite this historical cultural baggage, however, there are signs that an alternative model of development is also emerging. There is more discussion of sustainable development at the top levels of Chinese leadership than in almost any Western country, and incentives for industry to create "green" jobs and innovations are significant. The stalled effort to establish an annual "Green GDP" to evaluate the environmental costs of economic development may be revived. The stringent automobile fuel efficiency standards are a credit to the nation. Reconsideration of and debate over plans to build multiple dams on the pristine Nu River and Upper Yangzi in Yunnan may reduce their number and degree of impact. There is thus a possibility that China's preoccupation with "face" and national identity may yet be channeled in support of an alternative model that the world has not yet seen. Of course, there is no simple, direct causal relationship

between attitudes and beliefs, on the one hand, and behavior and policy on the other (Bruun and Kalland 1995); a solid environmental education for all children and public promotion of "green" values would not be sufficient to shift China or the world onto a less damaging path. However, they may be necessary first steps. China may be able to resolve its environmental crisis using technological leapfrogging and courageous policy making to become a global leader in truly sustainable development. For this transformation to succeed, however, a national dialogue and effort to promote a "green" national identity, and to engage and empower public participation and civil society, will be required.

QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION

1. To what extent do you think that traditional Chinese attitudes and beliefs shape behavior and policy with respect to interaction with the non-human world? Are teaching values of sustainability and strong scientific training about the costs of global resource depletion and pollution necessary to shift human interactions with non-human nature in China? Is a spiritual renaissance the answer? Is your response the same or different for your own country?
2. How does China's history affect its citizens' attitudes toward China's role in the world? How might that history affect China's prospects for sustainable development? Can you discuss this question for your own country?
3. How do culinary, medical, and philosophical traditions affect relationships with non-human species in China? In your country?
4. Given the Chinese people's recent history of privation, should we feel surprised at the new culture of conspicuous consumption? How important is material wealth to living a good life?

5 In what ways does the Chinese relationship with the environment mirror that of all humans living on the planet? Can you find any resemblances between the Han Chinese modern relationship with nature and that of global modern society, and what are the differences? Do you feel that the prospects for China to address its environmental concerns are better than those for the globe as a whole, worse, or the same?

6 How is Chinese national identity different from yours? How is it similar? Can you identify an environmental issue where you could find common ground with Chinese attitudes? Is there any evidence in your country of a sustainability ethic? If so, what are its core elements?

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

- Forum on Religion and Ecology (Yale University), at: http://bioethics.yale.edu/resources/forum-religion-and-ecology
- Gary Marcuse, "Searching for Sacred Mountain" (Film), available at: http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/searching-sacred-mountain-religion-environment-gary-marcuse-shi-lihong
- Orville Schell, "China: Humiliation and the Olympics," July 2008. Available on the *New York Review of Books* website.
- TRAFFIC information on TCM and the trade in endangered species: www.traffic.org
- Lu Xun, *The True Story of Ah Q* (1921), Marxists Internet Archive, at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/lu-xun/1921/12/ah-q/index.htm

5 Public Participation and Civil Society: The View from Below

Chinese civil society faces severe limitations in its ability to organize, communicate, and conduct activities. Yet even as there are tremendous changes with respect to the environment from the top down, as well as new demands for pollution controls and food safety from influential middle-class consumers, the grass roots are feeling their power and becoming active. They often form partnerships with the upper reaches of the bureaucracy in order to pressure corrupt developers, self-interested local officials, lower- and middle-level bureaucrats and polluting factory operators. Almost all citizens' groups cultivate ties with top leaders and agencies as a form of protection and assurance of a green light for their activities.

It is important not to over-generalize about Chinese civil society, for China is a large, diverse, and unevenly developed country, with unequal distribution of resources and local empowerment. The eastern seaboard and urban areas have different characteristics and dynamics than rural areas and interior western provinces. Nonetheless, even in remote areas such as the Nu River region near Myanmar and the Upper Yangzi near the Tibetan Autonomous Region, there are signs of an increasingly vibrant civil society. Indeed, environmental organizing in Yunnan province in the Southwest is in some ways more free than in Beijing. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, some less developed regions of Western China are hothouses of biodiversity inhabited by ethnic minority nationality people, who often have political reasons for resisting the dominance of the Han. This combination contributes to